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BOOK REVIEW
JUSTIFYING KILLING IN SELF-DEFENCE
ARLETTE GRABCZYNSKA* &
KIMBERLY KESSLER FERZAN**
FIONA LEVERICK, KILLING IN SELF-DEFENCE (OXFORD UNIVERSITY
PRESS 2006). 217 pp.
I. JUSTIFYING KILLING IN SELF-DEFENCE1
Based on first appearances, one might think that self-defense is easy to
justify. A bad guy threatens to kill you, so you kill him. Enough said.
However, once one scratches the surface, self-defense becomes far
more complicated. Why is it permissible to kill "the bad guy"? If one is a
consequentalist, one must account for how the aggressor's life gets
discounted.2 And, if the consequentalist seeks to include deterrent values in
the mix (such as discouraging all aggression), then the right to self-defense
becomes contingent, ultimately depending on how the math works out in
any given case.3
A rights-based approach appears more promising but also quickly runs
into difficulties. If the defender has a right to life, so too does the
aggressor. What happens to the latter's right? If one thinks that the
aggressor "forfeits" his right to life, what explains why the right is
Associate, DLA Piper LLP (U.S.), J.D. 2008, University of Illinois College of Law.
Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Professor of Law, Co-Director, Institute for
Law & Philosophy, Rutgers School of Law-Camden.
I FIONA LEVERICK, KILLING IN SELF-DEFENCE (2006).
2 Sanford H. Kadish, Respect for Life and Regard for Rights in the Criminal Law, 64
CAL. L. REV. 871, 882 (1976) (noting that the rule "contradicts the equality principle that the
lives of all persons must be regarded, as lives, of equal value").
3 Id. at 883 ("The argument rests on the contingent fact that justifying deadly force will,
in the long run, save more lives by deterring deadly assaults.").
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magically regained once the attack is over? 4 If one seeks to specify the
right to life so that one does not have the right to life if, for example, one is
"aggressing," then one must look for normative considerations external to
the right to life to justify the specification.5 That is, the aggression must
somehow justify the right to self-defense; the right to life, then, has no
explanatory power of its own.
What is particularly striking is that only a handful of books attempt to
resolve these problems. Myriad articles, mainly in philosophy journals-
but some in law reviews-attempt to justify self-defense. But books that
probe the depths of the defense are few and far between. Indeed, until
2006, the only book solely devoted to the theory of self-defense was
Suzanne Uniacke's Permissible Killing.6  Thus, the appearance of two
books in 2006 on self-defense is significant.7 One author, Boaz Sangero,
took on a consequentalist approach; the other book's author, Fiona
Leverick, went down the path of rights-based accounts. It is this latter path
that we will explore in this review.
8
In her book Killing in Self-Defence, Leverick attempts to provide a
normative justification for self-defense within the rights-based tradition.
9
She takes the right to life to be fundamental, and then accounts for the
moral asymmetry between defender and aggressor by embracing forfeiture.
4 Judith Jarvis Thomson, Self-Defense and Rights, in RIGHTS, RESTITUTION, & RISK:
ESSAYS IN MORAL THEORY 33 (1986) (arguing that if an aggressor becomes incapable of
attacking, then there is no right to self-defense and asking how forfeiture can accommodate
these factors).
5 See id. at 37-39. One can either go the normative route and find normative
considerations external to the right to self-defense to justify the forfeiture, or go the factual
route and specify the facts under which one does not have the right to life. Factual
specification then appears ad hoc, however, as there is no unitary normative principle that
binds the facts together. As Thomson explains:
What the friend of factual specification has to do is to figure out when it is permissible to kill,
and then tailor, accordingly, his account of what right it is which is the most we have in respect
of life. But if that is the only way anyone can have of finding out what right it is we have in
respect of life, how can anyone then explain its being permissible to kill in such and such
circumstances by appeal to the fact that killing in those circumstances does not violate the right
which is the most the victim has in respect of life?
Id. at 39.
6 SUZANNE UNIACKE, PERMISSIBLE KILLING: THE SELF-DEFENCE JUSTIFICATION OF
HOMICIDE (1994). Although George Fletcher wrote A Crime of Self-Defense in 1988, we
think it is fair to say that his specific study of the Bernhard Goetz case does not qualify as
setting forth a general theory of self-defense. See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, A CRIME OF SELF
DEFENSE: BERNHARD GOETZ AND THE LAW ON TRIAL (1988).
7 LEVERICK, supra note 1; BOAZ SANGERO, SELF-DEFENCE IN CRIMINAL LAW (2006).
8 Leverick has reviewed Sangero's book. Fiona Leverick, Defending Self-Defence, 27
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 563 (2007).
9 LEVERICK, supra note 1.
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Specifically, Leverick claims that one forfeits one's right to life "by virtue
of her conduct in becoming an unjust immediate threat to the -life of
another."10 After presenting her theory, Leverick applies it to a number of
important questions including retreat," imminence, 12 self-generated self-
defense,13 killing to protect property1
4 *or to prevent rape,' 5 and mistake.'
6
She also provides a chapter on the compatibility of permitting killing in
defense of property and the European Convention on Human Rights'
Article 2, which protects an individual's right to life.'
7
Leverick's book is the reworking of her earlier doctoral thesis and
reads as such. 18 Thus, the book is full of discussions of the work of others
as well as Leverick's own views, which is both a blessing and a curse. We
would recommend the early chapters of the book to anyone who seeks a
fairly succinct and clear background of the competing legal theories about
self-defense. Other readers may be impatient to get to the heart of
Leverick's arguments, rather than wading through familiar territory. There
are also several instances in which Leverick's theory appears to be
supported only by her critique of others' accounts rather than by a clear
affirmative argument for her own views.
The scope, focus, and writing of this book are quite good. Although
Leverick draws on Suzanne Uniacke's theory,' 9 the two books could not be
more different. Uniacke spends the vast majority of her work arguing about
double effect, discussing early philosophers, and only then sets forth a
normative theory. Leverick, on the other hand, quickly moves to the
normative discussion, setting forth her thesis early on, and then endeavors
to apply her theory to criminal law questions. The book therefore has
tremendous potential. But does it meet that potential?
Unfortunately, our answer is no. The critical problem with Leverick's
argument is her failure to justify forfeiture, the backbone of her theory.
Although Leverick offers many interesting insights along the way, we do




12 Id. at 87-108.
13 Id. at 109-30.
14 Id. at 131-42.
"5 Id. at 143-58.
16 Id. at 159-76.
'7 Id. at 177-96.
18 Id. at 3.
19 UNIACKE, supra note 6.
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The number of topics covered in this book makes it difficult for an in-
depth discussion of each; thus, this review will focus on Leverick's central
forfeiture claim and her theory's applicability outside the context of killing
to prevent killings. Part II sets the stage by discussing the quest for the holy
grail-the justification for self-defense. Part III summarizes Leverick's
reasoning and proposes that there are two significant flaws with her
forfeiture argument. First, Leverick's conditional forfeiture argument
appears to be ad hoc. She simply constructs the right to self-defense around
her intuitions without setting forth a principled argument for doing so.
Second, Leverick cannot explain why innocent aggressors and threats, her
own defined test cases, forfeit their rights. Part IV discusses the limits of
Leverick's exploration of the use of deadly force for self-defense, noting
both that Leverick's treatment of defensive force by battered women is
inconsistent with her treatment of killing to prevent rape and that Leverick's
reliance on the right to life as foundational limits her ability to explain why
one may use non-deadly force against a non-deadly aggressor. We
conclude that Leverick's theory is not successful. She attempts to justify
the killing of those whom she should not-innocent aggressors and passive
threats-without offering a persuasive argument for so doing, and she fails
to present a theory capable of including those whom she must-non-deadly
defenders. Leverick's theories of forfeiture and the right to life ultimately
do not justify self-defense.
II. THE QUEST TO JUSTIFY SELF-DEFENSE
Before discussing Leverick's view, it is necessary to defend why the
obvious is not actually so obvious. That is, why is the justification for self-
defense seen as a puzzle?
A. CONSEQUENTIALIST ACCOUNTS
One potential way to explain the right to self-defense is to argue that it
is the lesser evil. It is better that the defender kill the aggressor than vice
versa. Within this rubric, self-defense may not even appear to be a hard
case. Unfortunately, there are a number of problems with this position.
First, one must still give an account of why the culpable aggressor's life is
discounted.20 After all, why isn't the balance between the aggressor and the
defender simply a draw? Indeed, how do we balance these lives if, in all
other respects, the culpable aggressor has more value for society (a doctor
20 Kadish, supra note 2, at 882 (noting that the rule contradicts the equality principle);
David Wasserman, Justifying Self-Defense, 16 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 356, 358 (1987)
("Unfortunately, the analogy begs the critical question of why it is a lesser evil to kill the
aggressor.").
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working on the cure for cancer) than his innocent victim (a criminal law
theorist)?21 Second, the consequentalist view seems to indicate that if many
culpable aggressors attacked a lone innocent defender, there would be a
point at which the balance would tip in favor of the aggressors. 22 But that
simply cannot be right. You get to kill as many bad guys as threaten you.
23
Moreover, consequentialist accounts are problematic even if we
include the value of having a more general rule of self-defense. First, such
a rule seems too narrow. If we simply want to deter violence, we might
prefer a far broader rule, allowing for retaliation or other punitive acts.24
Second, and more importantly, the approach obscures the importance of the
relationship between the defender and the aggressor. The defender's act is
not justified because the aggressor aims to harm her, but because of some
greater societal value. This view also leads to the conclusion that a given
defender is not justified in a case in which the action would not deter
others' aggression. But we think most people would agree that a culpable
aggressor may still be killed in these instances.
To put this point another way, to view self-defense as serving some
broader societal goal is to make it contingent.25 Because the law will not be
in a position to calculate in every instance, we will have a broad rule
prohibiting aggression. However, in any individual case, it may be that that
rule is overinclusive and the defender should not have the right to self-
defense. It strikes us that this cannot be so: it cannot be that a criminal law
theorist cannot defend against a culpable attack by a philanthropic scientist
while they are (briefly) stranded on a desert island. It cannot be that the
right to defend crucially depends on society getting sufficient bang for the
self-defense buck.
21 Wasserman, supra note 20, at 359 ("The law permits the aggressor's life to be taken
even if his survival is linked to other, innocent lives: a victim is entitled to kill an aggressor
even if his killing is sure to provoke widespread bloodshed, or even if the aggressor is on the
brink of discovering a cure for cancer or a solution to African famine.").
22 Id.
23 Kadish, supra note 2, at 882 ("For surely the rule allows one attacked to kill all his
attackers no matter how numerous they may be."). The consequentalist cannot eliminate this
problem by suggesting pair-wise comparisons, that is, to compare each aggressor to the
innocent defender. Imagine a case in which all the aggressors are in a plane and shooting at
the defender, and the defender can blow up the plane and kill them all. The defender must
know whether this one action will be the lesser evil.
24 Id. at 883 (noting that deterrence would support retaliation); Wasserman, supra note
20, at 360 (noting that deterrence cannot explain retreat or proportionality).
25 Kadish, supra note 2, at 883 (noting that the "argument rests on the contingent fact





Rights-based views start from a different premise. Typically, they
begin with the very strong claim that we have a right to life, or a right not to
be killed. Second, because self-defense is necessary to protect this right, we
must allow defenders to use force to prevent their own extinction.
Although rights-based accounts appear promising, there are significant
difficulties here. Most problematic is the need to account for the
asymmetry between the defender and the aggressor; if the defender has a
right to life, so too does the aggressor. Indeed, the central question in self-
defense is why one is allowed to take a life to preserve a life. At this point,
theorists begin to talk of forfeiting the right to life, specifying the right to
life (one has the right except ... ), or overriding the right to life (one may
be killed if. . . ).26
The first move available to the rights theorist is to claim that the
aggressor, by virtue of his aggression, forfeits his right to life. The
problems with this view are well known. First, forfeiture cannot explain
how the aggressor regains his right to life. Yet, if the aggressor stops the
attack, the defender can no longer kill him, either then or the following
week. Somehow the right to life is magically regained.27 Second, forfeiture
does not impose any limitation on what anyone can do to the aggressor, that
is, it seems to justify conduct that goes far beyond defensive force. Third,
this view stands in stark contrast to the rest of the law, where individuals
may not consent to be killed.28
Another approach is to say that the aggressor's right to life may be
overridden, or the right to life is specified such that one does not have a
right to life when one presents an unjust immediate threat to others.
Notably, once one looks to overriding or specifying the right, all of the
work of the argument is done not by the right to life itself, but by some
consideration external to the right that allows us to specify or override it. In
other words, an account of self-defense must provide a principled
explanation for why and how the right to life may be overridden or
specified.29
26 See generally Thomson, supra note 4 (critiquing these moves in favor of the
infringing-violating distinction). Thomson has since adopted a forfeiture view. Judith Jarvis
Thomson, Self-Defense, 20 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 283, 302 (1991) ("I suggest that what makes it
permissible for you to kill [a culpable aggressor, an innocent aggressor, and an innocent
threat] is the fact that they will otherwise violate your rights that they not kill you, and
therefore lack rights that you not kill them.").
27 Thomson, supra note 4, at 34-35.
28 Kadish, supra note 2, at 884.
29 See DAVID RODIN, WAR & SELF-DEFENSE (2002) (discussing these problems with
specification theories). Notably, some rights-theorists will not disagree with this claim. For
[Vol. 99
JUSTIFYING KILLING IN SELF-DEFENCE
C. THE CENTRALITY OF INNOCENT AGGRESSORS AND THREATS
The question of self-defense is further complicated by the appearance
of innocent aggressors and threats. An innocent aggressor is someone who
would not be deemed legally responsible for his act of aggression. 30  A
child or a mentally insane person who aggresses against another would be
considered an innocent aggressor. A passive (or innocent) threat, on the
other hand, does not aggress, but nevertheless poses a direct threat to the
life of the defender through other means.31 In Robert Nozick's famous
example, one person is stuck in the bottom of a well, and another man is
hurled down the well. The defender must either shoot the falling man with
his disintegrate gun (philosophers may live in ivory towers, but they
employ some extraordinary weapons) or be crushed.32 The falling man is a
passive threat.
The critical divide within the self-defense literature is at the point of
these innocents. Some theorists maintain that a legitimate theory of self-
defense must render permissible the killing of an innocent aggressor or
threat.33  Theorists then attempt to offer an account of self-defense that
includes these aggressors. Other theorists, who do not share these
intuitions, often reject that self-defense justifies the killing of these
innocents.34
instance, John Oberdiek, who adopts a specification view of rights in general, claims that we
argue to rights, notfrom them. Rights are the conclusions of moral argument. Then, as we
argue above, we need other principles to explain the limits and values that override or
specify the right. See John Oberdiek, Specifying Rights Out of Necessity, 28 OXFORD J.
LEGAL STUD. 127 (2008).
30 LEVERICK, supra note 1, at 5.
31 id.
32 ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 34 (1974).
33 See, e.g., UNIACKE, supra note 6, at 177 ("The positive right to use lethal force in self-
defence.., does not derive from culpability on the part of the aggressor ...."); Claire
Oakes Finkelstein, On the Obligation of the State to Extend a Right of Self-Defense to Its
Citizens, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 1361, 1385 (1999) ("It... seems odd to think that the strength
of the right varies with the characteristics of the attacker, rather than with the magnitude of
the threat to the relevant interest."); Kadish, supra note 2, at 882 (critiquing the lesser evil
view of self-defense for failing to account for the killing of innocent threats); Thomson,
supra note 26, at 286 ("What I think is clear in any event is that if the aggressor will
(certainly) take your life unless you kill him, then his being or not being at fault for his
aggression is irrelevant to the question [of] whether you may kill him."); Shlomit
Wallerstein, Justifying the Right to Self-Defense: A Theory of Forced Consequences, 91 VA.
L. REV. 999, 1009-10 (2005) ("Drawing [a] line between culpable and nonculpable
aggressors is counterintuitive.").
34 See, e.g., SANGERO, supra note 7, at 48 ("[T]he case of the innocent aggressor does not
in any way refute the theory that focuses on the aggressor's culpability, and for the simple
reason that this case does not fall within the bounds of private defence at all."); Kimberly
Kessler Ferzan, Justifying Self-Defense, 24 LAW & PHIL. 711, 734 (2005) ("[O]ne may not
2009]
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In some respects these are rather strange test cases around which to
build one's theory. It is not an everyday occurrence to be attacked by a
small child with a gun or trapped in an elevator with a psychotic
aggressor, 35 and even more unlikely that you would find yourself at the
bottom of a well, only to have your enemy push some man on top of you.
Now, perhaps the recent attacks at Virginia Tech reveal that we do need a
theory governing when one may kill a psychotic aggressor,36 but it is
important to note that we need not use self-defense for that theory. If
killing one psychotic aggressor will save many innocent people, it may be
that this killing is justified by the doctrine of necessity, and not self-
defense.37 The only other likely use of "innocent" force is by a person
acting as a result of some mistake. However, these attacks are also
complicated by the fact that those using this sort of mistaken deadly force
may be law enforcement officers, and we may want a different rule for law
enforcement than for other mistaken attackers.
In summary, despite the intuitive plausibility of a right to self-defense,
theorists find it extraordinarily difficult to justify. Moreover, one critical
question is what this right covers. Must one have a theory that justifies
defense against innocents as well as the culpable? These are the puzzles
that Leverick seeks to resolve.
III. FAILING TO JUSTIFY SELF-DEFENSE
A. LEVERICK'S ARGUMENT: FORFEITING THE RIGHT TO LIFE
After beginning with the premise that self-defense is a justification,
and adopting John Gardner's view of justification,38 Leverick surveys the
rightly kill [innocent aggressors] because they did not intentionally create the situation that
forced the choice by the defender."); Wasserman, supra note 20, at 364 ("If self-defense is a
right against an aggressor, it is a right against culpable aggressors only.").
35 The elevator scenario was famously imagined by George Fletcher. George P. Fletcher,
Proportionality and the Psychotic Aggressor: A Vignette in Comparative Criminal Theory, 8
ISR. L. REv. 367, 371 (1973).
36 See Brigid Schulte & Chris L. Jenkins, Cho Didn't Get Court-Ordered Treatment,
May 7, 2007, at Al, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article
/2007/05/06/AR2007050601403.html.
37 SANGERO, supra note 7, at 60 ("[T]he correct place for repelling the innocent aggressor
is the 'necessity' exception ....").
38 Leverick argues that self-defense is an archetypal justification. LEVERICK, supra note
1, at 2. She then claims that an actor has a justification if, all things considered, the conduct
is "acceptable." Id. at 21. Finally, she argues that to have a justification, the actor must not
only engage in conduct that is objectively justified, but also act for that (explanatory) reason.
Id. at 26. Although we disagree with much of this analysis, one of us has adopted a dual-
requirement view, albeit for very different reasons. See Ferzan, supra note 34 (arguing that
self-defense consists of an actual, culpable attack coupled with a subjective belief that
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common ground described above as well as other theories such as personal
partiality and the doctrine of double effect. 39 Leverick ultimately finds
promise within the right-based tradition and forfeiture, specifically.
Leverick sets out her theory, stating that the value of human life
outweighs any other value.4 ° She argues that the right to life is a
fundamental right unlike any other right because (1) this right is necessary
for the enjoyment of all other rights and (2) its violation is irreparable.41
The permissibility of killing in self-defense is based on the fact that the
source of the threat compromises the defender's right to life, thereby
forfeiting the aggressor's right to life and allowing the defender to kill him.
She states that in self-defense the defender acts against someone who poses
a direct threat to her life or physical integrity.42  This encompasses
aggressors and passive threats, but does not permit the killing of
bystanders.43
Leverick argues that "[t]he reason why it is permissible to kill the
aggressor is that the aggressor forfeits her right to life by virtue of her
conduct in becoming an unjust immediate threat to the life of another.,
44
Thus, Leverick takes the position that culpability of the aggressor is not a
necessary element in establishing the permissibility of using self-defensive
force.45 Her argument, she admits, draws heavily on the work of other
theorists, mainly Uniacke and Thomson.46 Leverick reiterates Uniacke's
position that forfeiture is not based on the wrongdoing of the aggressor or
the passive threat.47  She argues that forfeiture, although typically
associated with wrongdoing or punishment for behavior, is not intended to
be used in that sense in her theory.48 Specifically, Leverick states
defensive force is necessary to repel it). Given that the "conditions of justification" debate is
flourishing elsewhere, we will not attend to it here.
39 LEVERICK, supra note 1, at 50-54. Leverick dismisses personal partiality as a theory of
self-defense. Id. at 52 ("It is difficult to see why it is permissible for someone to favour her
own life over that of another simply because it is her own life and therefore of value to
her."). She rejects the doctrine of double effect as too fine a distinction. Id. at 54. ("The
moral distinction between intending to kill an aggressor in self-defence and using lethal
force in self-defence but merely foreseeing (but not intending) that the death of the aggressor
would result is too fine to be meaningful.").
40 Id. at 3.
41 Id. at 58.
42 Id. at 6.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 45.
45 Id. at 6.
46 Id. at 45.




"[f]orfeiture is associated here with conduct alone. 4 9 She concedes that
one of the definitions of forfeit is "to lose by misconduct," but she argues
that the definition of the word she seeks to use in her theory is the one that
does not suggest misconduct but, simply is "'to lose; to lose the right
to' ... 'to lose or give up'.
Leverick seeks to avoid the traditional criticisms associated with
forfeiture by defining a very narrow time-frame during which the right is
forfeited. She claims that the right to life is only forfeited by the threat
during the time he is a threat and only if there are no other ways in which
the victim can save his own life without harming the threat.5' In her
defense of forfeiture, Leverick argues that the reason a victim is permitted
to kill the threat is not because he deserves to die, but because the threat's
conduct made him an unjust immediate threat to the victim. 52 Leverick
explains "[t]he reason the victim is permitted to kill the aggressor, but the
aggressor is not permitted to kill the victim, is that the aggressor, by virtue
of her conduct in becoming an unjust immediate threat to the life of the
victim that cannot be avoided by any less harmful means, forfeits her right
to life.
53
To summarize, Leverick's forfeiture theory does not depend on any
misconduct or culpability. Rather, all that is required is that a person
constitute a threat to another's right to life. This forfeiture, however, is
limited. The threat's right to life is forfeited only for so long as she is a
threat. Moreover, this forfeiture is also restricted by the defender's ability
to use less deadly means-if the defender does not need to kill the threat,
then the aggressor's life is not forfeited.
There are two problems with Leverick's account of forfeiture. First,
her "temporary forfeiture only while necessary" theory is unprincipled and
ad hoc. Second, she fails to justify how innocent aggressors and passive
threats can forfeit their right to life.
B. FAILING TO JUSTIFY FORFEITURE
How can one temporarily forfeit his right to life? Because the
permanent forfeiture argument has the potential for creating different
classes of people-those with a reduced level of protection because of past
acts and those with a regular level of protection 54 -Leverick attempts to
49 Id.
50 Id. (referencing the Oxford English Dictionary online).
"' Id. at 66.
52 Id.
53 id.
54 See Wallerstein, supra note 33, at 1019.
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sidestep the question of classification by saying that forfeiture is
55temporary. This move, however, seems contrived and inconsistent with
any understanding of what forfeiture entails.56
At one level, our complaint is semantic. Leverick goes to great lengths
to chastise Uniacke for not using the language of forfeiture, but the
language of forfeiture seems profoundly misplaced.57 To forfeit one's right
is not to give it up temporarily. It is to give it up.
But our complaint goes beyond the semantic.58 Leverick's temporary
forfeiture language stands as a placeholder for any actual argument for why
it is morally permissible to kill the threat for that limited time. Compare the
argument offered by the moral philosopher Jeff McMahan.59 McMahan
argues that it is permissible to kill someone when he is responsible for
being a threat to another, and McMahan advances some rather complex
views about how one can be responsible. 60  Notice, then, that the
responsibility condition can be severed from the threat condition. That a
defender can only defend against a threat-the necessity limitation-is not
itself part of the responsibility condition. In other words, if McMahan says
that negligent risking renders one liable to defensive force such that a
defender can use deadly force when there is a threat of harm, the temporal
condition is not part of the reason why the aggressor has, in Leverick's
terms, "forfeited" his right to life. But this means that neither the forfeiture
label nor the temporal necessity limitation can do the work of explaining
why some can be killed and not others. Or, to put the point another way,
55 LEVERICK, supra note 1, at 64 ("The reason why it is not permissible to kill an
aggressor once she ceases her attack is that the aggressor is no longer an unjust immediate
threat.").
56 Wallerstein, supra note 33, at 1020 ("Constructing the right not to be killed as an
indefinite number of rights in personam-directed against each person separately-seems
artificial.").
57 LEVERICK, supra note 1, at 62 ("Uniacke might explicitly reject the terminology of
forfeiture but forfeiture is effectively what she is describing.").
58 Leverick is willing to forego the language of forfeiture for the language of
specification. Id. at 67; see also RODIN, supra note 29, at 74 ("Whether we choose to
describe the right to life as limited in scope or as subject to forfeiture, seems, from a
theoretical point of view, immaterial.").
59 Jeff McMahan, The Basis of Moral Liability to Defensive Killing, 15 PHIL. ISSUES 386
(2005).
60 Id. at 397 ("I will assume that it is a condition of responsibility for an unjust threat that
the action that gave rise to the threat either was of a risk-imposing type or was such that in
the circumstances the agent ought to have foreseen that it carried a non-negligible risk of
causing a significant unjust harm.").
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the triggering conditions should not be part of the limitations on the
defense. 61 But Leverick's analysis conflates the two.
This conflation is most evident when one considers instances in which
retreat is possible. Leverick claims that if the defender can retreat, she
should.62 But this seems odd: if the aggressor has forfeited his right to life,
the defender would not wrong him by killing him. Leverick's answer is
that forfeiture only applies when killing is the only way that the defender
can prevent harm to herself.63 But this strikes us as extraordinarily
contrived. It is one thing for one to forfeit one's rights through some action
or intention; it is quite another for that forfeiture to occur only if the other
person needs the right to be forfeited. That is, although we do not dispute
that self-defense may be bilateral-dealing with the relationship between
aggressor and defender-we do dispute that forfeiture can be bilateral.
Ultimately, Leverick still needs a moral argument for why there is
such forfeiture. The fact that she lacks such an argument is apparent when
64we examine her own test cases-innocent aggressors and passive threats.
First, we note that Leverick requires that a theory justify the killing of the
innocent based on her intuitions. She disposes of forfeiture-based theories
that justify the killing of aggressors on the basis of the aggressor's
culpability, by stating that "instinctively this seems wrong., 65  She
continues by stating that "[k]illing a life-threatening aggressor, innocent or
otherwise, feels intuitively like a permissible action.,
66
But once we get beyond Leverick's intuitions, she offers no principled
reason why her forfeiture theory should apply to innocent aggressors or
passive threats. Leverick simply fails to explain why the innocent
aggressor or a passive threat forfeits his life by his conduct if his conduct is
not voluntary.67 Further, Leverick fails to address how people can avoid
losing their right to life if involuntary acts lead to forfeiture. In her scheme
of justified killing, anyone who is walking around can, at any time, forfeit
his right to life by virtue of being used as a weapon against another or by
61 "Justifications... all have the following internal structure: Triggering conditions
permit a necessary and proportional response." PAUL H. ROBINSON, STRUCTURE AND
FUNCTION IN CRIMINAL LAW 98 (1997).
62 LEVERICK, supra note 1, ch. 4.
63 Id. at 66.
64 Id. at 44 ("[I]t is the aim of this chapter to put forward an account of the permissibility
of self-defensive killing that explains why it is permissible to kill a culpable aggressor, an




67 Id. at 67 ("Forfeiture is associated here with conduct alone." (emphasis omitted)).
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sheer bad luck. If the right to life is as fundamental and important as
Leverick claims, we fail to see how she can justify this implication.
Indeed, we sincerely doubt that a theory of self-defense can justify the
killing of innocents. Uniacke, a scholar upon whom Leverick draws, has
defended fault-free forfeiture by arguing that there are certain situations in
which people face forfeiture despite the fact that they did nothing wrong.
68
As an example, Uniacke argues that a ticket holder can blamelessly forfeit a
right. 69 But consider that case. Suppose Tom purchases a plane ticket and
he arrives at the airport late due to a traffic accident that was not his fault.
Tom, by virtue of missing the flight, might be said to have forfeited his
right to be on the flight, as the flight has already departed. Further,
depending on the airline, Tom may not be permitted to get on another flight
unless he pays a certain fee to the airline for changing his flight. This type
of forfeiture, however, is entirely contractual. For a higher price, Tom
could have purchased a refundable fare which would have protected him in
the event of such an occurrence, and he would not have forfeited his right to
fly without a penalty. Further, it is entirely possible, although expensive,
for Tom to contract out of forfeiture entirely by chartering a plane, which
guarantees the flight will not depart without him. Again, this situation
involves the buying of goods or services, and in the initial scenario Tom's
ticket price, which makes it affordable for most to fly, is lower because the
plane flies a number of people beyond Tom. It would be inefficient and
disruptive to others to force the plane to wait until he arrived.
It is much more difficult to defend a situation in which a person
forfeits his right to life due to no action or fault of his own. Unlike the
forfeiture in the above example, which involves the consideration of other
people's contractual or property rights and is exercised to ensure that one
purchaser does not inconvenience others as a result of his failure to appear
at the agreed-upon location and time, Leverick's examples juxtapose the
threat's life against the victim's life. Furthermore, contractual forfeiture
involves the forfeiture of goods or services, both of which can be replaced.
Leverick's entire argument is premised on the right to life being
fundamental precisely because it is necessary for the enjoyment of other
rights and because it is not replaceable.7v Yet, while Tom has the option to
contract out of forfeiture for a price, in Leverick's scenario there is nothing
68 See, e.g., id. at 62 ("'A forfeit is a penalty and.., the imposition of a penalty by way
of a forfeited right constitutes a disadvantage which need not imply the culpability or
punishment of the one who forfeits."' (citing UNIACKE, supra note 6, at 195)); see also
UNIACKE, supra note 6, at 206 (providing an example of a ticket holder to a show forfeiting
her right to see it, due to no fault of her own).
69 UNIACKE, supra note 6, at 206.
70 LEVERICK, supra note 1, at 58.
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a threat could do to avoid forfeiting his right to life when his conduct is not
voluntary.
Other theorists who have tried justifying the killing of innocent
aggressors and passive threats have run into similar problems. For
example, Wallerstein,7" who justifies the killing of culpable aggressors on
the basis of forcing the morally blameworthy party "to pay the price" for his
actions, simply says that non-culpable aggressors and threats must suffer
the consequences of their bad luck.72 This argument is similar to Leverick's
in that it presumes that the threat is the only one having the bad luck and
that causality can be easily determined. Ultimately the problem with a
theory holding that one forfeits his life by virtue of becoming an unjust
immediate threat is that it assigns the responsibility to the threat alone, but
causation is itself insufficient for this assignment.
Consider Abe, who is walking along a sidewalk and by virtue of bad
luck falls into an uncovered manhole. Calvin, his archenemy, takes this
opportunity to push Bob down the manhole to kill Abe by landing on him.
Abe and Bob can both be said to have had the bad luck of being in a
situation that now requires a choice between their lives. Further, it could be
argued that both are the cause of the predicament in which they find
themselves. After all, if Abe had not fallen into the manhole then
presumably Calvin would not have had a reason to throw Bob into the
manhole. Moreover, if Bob would have survived the fall if Abe had not
been there (because he would not need anyone to break his fall and no one
would be threatening his life), then how do we establish whose bad luck
necessitates that he suffer the consequences?
Applying Leverick's theory, it is still unclear why Bob forfeits his
right to life by virtue of his conduct-if being pushed can even qualify as
conduct-when Abe and Bob simultaneously are posing a threat to each
other's lives and if both would have survived had it not been for the other's
presence. Ronald Coase identified the reciprocal nature of this problem.73
Wallerstein takes the position that the defender can never be considered a
source of threat by virtue of being present, but she also supposes that the
aggressor's act triggers the threat.74 However, in the hypothetical above, it
was Abe's bad luck that triggered Bob's fall, which is seen as the threat.
71 Wallerstein, supra note 33, at 1028.
72 Id. at 1030-32.
73 R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960) (noting that the
correct answer to the question about whether a confectioner who uses machinery which
disrupts a doctor can be prevented from operating such machinery considers the potential
harms of such a decision to both the confectioner and the doctor, as opposed to considering
only the harm caused to the doctor).
74 Wallerstein, supra note 33, at 1031.
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Ultimately, the causation/threat approach is a theoretical dead end.
Yes, the threat will kill the defender, but the defender is going to kill the
threat. One person will live; one will die. Causal responsibility cannot
distinguish threat from defender, as the "forced choice" is a result of both
people's actions. Ultimately, we have two innocent actors. We have a
tragedy. We may wish to excuse the defender, but there is no basis on
which to justify his or her choice to prefer his or her own life to that of
another innocent.
Indeed, we strongly suspect that many people's intuitions here about
the problem of innocent aggressors are subject to framing bias.75  The
hypotheticals are presented in such a way that one imagines that one is at
the bottom of the well or stuck in the elevator with the psychotic aggressor.
But if we truly want to imagine the innocence and lack of conduct on the
threat's part, then we must ask the question from the perspective of the
threat as well. Should the defender shoot you as you plummet toward him?
And, even if you would understand and excuse such conduct, is the
defender justified in killing you? Would that justification carry the (typical)
implications that others are justified in aiding him in killing you? That you
may not justifiably defend yourself?
Leverick and other theorists trying to justify the killing of innocent
aggressors and passive threats fail to adequately explain precisely why it is
permissible to distribute the harm to the threat when faced with a choice
between two innocent lives. Forfeiture typically implies some type of
wrongdoing, or at least some sort of doing. Simply redefining it in a
counterintuitive way to accommodate her intuitions will not rescue the
underlying lack of principle inherent within Leverick's theory.
76
75 See generally Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Rational Choice and the Framing
of Decisions, in CHOICES, VALUES, & FRAMES 209 (2000) (discussing how the manner in
which a question is posed or "framed" will affect the answer).
76 Ultimately, David Rodin's summary of the problem with factual specification
arguments applies to Leverick's theory in full force:
The properly specified right to life would proceed something like this: 'persons only have the
ight not to be killed when not engaged in an aggressive attack, but they retain the right in cases
where their victim can escape without using lethal force, and/or where the victim's use of force
would be disproportionate, and/or where the threat presented is not imminent, and/or where the
victim's use of force does not arise from an intention to act in self defense and so on .... ' The
problem is that in thus specifying the scope of the right to life we have simply inserted all our
pre-existing intuitions about the permissible circumstances of self-defense. In doing so we sap
the notion of explanatory power, for if our conception of the right to life simply reflects our prior
intuitions on the permissible circumstances of self-defense, then we can hardly point to the
possession or absence of the right to explain our intuitions. The rights-centered account would
then become empty as an explanatory tool.
RODN, supra note 29, at 72.
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IV. THE LIMITS OF THE EXPLANATION
Our final concern is the narrowness of Leverick's theory. Leverick
claims that her position-starting with when one is justified in killing
another-is the appropriate starting point because it is the hardest case.
77
But her focus on the right to life and the right to kill to protect it creates
problems for extending the application of her theory beyond killings to
prevent killings.
In the first instance, Leverick's claim of a right to kill grounded in the
right to life is not itself well argued. Leverick claims the victim has a right
to life and therefore has a right to use lethal force to defend it.78 Of course,
this does not necessarily follow. Sally might have a right to a book, but she
may not be able to use force to defend that book, much less deadly force to
defend the book. Leverick is not entitled to assume that a right to
something entails that one has the right to use as much force as is necessary
to prevent the violation of that right. She needs to argue for it.
Leverick, however, does not provide an argument. Even after
Leverick asserts that the right to life is the most fundamental human right
because it is a prerequisite to everything else and because its violation
cannot be remedied,79 she still fails to take the additional step of arguing
from this right to life to the right to use deadly force. Indeed, Levick's
conflation of the two rights is most apparent when she claims that the right
to life is a Hohfeldian claim right.80 It may be that the right to life is such a
claim right, with which others owe a duty of noninterference, but this is not
to say that the right to defend one's life is also a claim right. We question
whether the core right to kill to prevent being killed is itself fully
developed.
Leverick then runs into immediate difficulty when she attempts to
extend the right to kill in self-defense to prevent harms other than death. As
just one instance of this more general problem, consider the inconsistency
at work with Leverick's approach to battered women killing in non-
confrontational settings and her position on killing to prevent rape. In the
case of battered women she notes that in even the worst cases, the abuse
(prior to the use of defensive force) did not amount to an actual threat of
death, thus she seeks to limit the use of self-defensive force. 1 Yet, in cases
77 LEVERICK, supra note 1, at 4.
78 Id. at 59 ("On its simplest level, the argument runs that an aggressor, by virtue of
attacking her victim, threatens to violate the victim's right to life. The victim is therefore
justified in using lethal defensive force to repel the threat because, in doing so, the victim is
simply protecting her right to life.").
'9 Id. at 58-59.
o Id. at 58-60.
s Id. at 92.
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of rape, Leverick dismisses limiting the use of self-defensive force only to
cases in which there is a threat of death or injury82 because rape, itself, is a
denial of humanity that is equivalent to the deprivation of life.83 Leverick
posits that the reason rape is a denial of humanity is because "the rapist uses
the victim as an object through the act of sexual penetration, an act that has
been given a particular significance by society, and, in doing so, denies the
victim's humanity. 84
Although Leverick aims to distinguish other offenses that may also
contain the element of "sheer use" by stating that rape is different due to the
act of sexual penetration, this differentiation is unconvincing and appears
simply too narrow.85 Denial of humanity implies more than the act of rape.
For instance, few would argue that the treatment of Judy Norman would not
qualify as a denial of humanity. Norman, who shot her husband while he
was 'sleeping, was consistently subjected to degradations ranging from
being forced to sleep on the floor and bark like a dog, to being compelled to
work as a prostitute to earn the family's only income. 86 Denial of humanity
is broader than the act of sexual penetration alone. If killing to prevent rape
is different than killing to prevent being used as an object, then it cannot
simply be that one is a denial of humanity and the other is not. There must
be a theory that explains why killing in one situation is more morally
permissible than killing in the other situation.
Finally, according to Leverick's own theory, battered women have a
stronger case for the use of self-defensive force than potential rape victims
do. Leverick's right to life account is based on the right to life being
fundamental because (1) the right to life is necessary for the enjoyment of
all other rights and (2) the violation of the right to life is irreparable.87 In at
least some cases the danger is so significant that arguably the abused
woman's right to life is threatened in the first sense, because she is unable
to enjoy any other rights due to the constraints placed on her by her abuser.
While Leverick consistently adheres to her mantra of the right to life being
a fundamental right in need of protection, she fails to address the violation
of that right in cases of battered women.
These difficulties, however, are just the tip of the iceberg. The
question is whether Leverick's theory can extend beyond the deadly force
cases. Can it explain why Bob may push Andy to prevent Andy from
82 Id. at 150-51.
83 Id. at 157-58.
84 id.
85 Id. at 157.
86 State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8, 10 (N.C. 1989); State v. Norman, 366 S.E.2d 586, 587
(N.C. Ct. App. 1988).
87 LEVERICK, supra note 1, at 58-59.
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punching Bob? Because Leverick's project focuses solely on the right to
life, she offers no guidance as to how one can justify using force against
non-deadly threats.
Moreover, if we extrapolate from her theory to the question of non-
deadly threats (and force), we see the further problems inherent in
Leverick's theory. To tackle the question of non-deadly force, Leverick
could take one of three problematic positions. First, Leverick could claim
that the defender has a right to autonomy-a general no interference right.
Second, Leverick could claim that the defender has a right to bodily
autonomy-a specific right that no one touch him. Finally, Leverick might
simply say that the defender has a right not to be hit. From any of these
rights, however, we would still need a principle as to why the appropriate
reaction is for the defender to prevent the attack. After all, because these
rights are not fundamental and noncompensable, the defender could always
sue the aggressor. So the first question we might ask is, how can these
cases be remotely like the cases that Leverick discusses?
Alternatively, unifying non-deadly and deadly force cases also spells
trouble for Leverick. She has explained why Celia may kill Dana to
prevent Celia's death. But compare the case of Bob using force to prevent
Andy's non-deadly attack. If Bob has a right to autonomy, so, too, does
Celia. If Bob has a right to bodily integrity, so, too, does Celia. And if Bob
has a right not to be hit, Celia also has a right not to be killed. In other
words, once we explain the Bob cases, the right to life moves from
centrality to utter irrelevance. If the Bob cases can be explained without
reference to the right to life, so, too, can the Celia cases.
A theory of self-defense should have explanatory power beyond killing
to prevent being killed.88  Leverick's does not. In the first instance,
Leverick twists her theory into contortions simply to justify killing to
prevent rape, a justification that is ultimately at war with the theory she
stakes out on imminence. Secondly, because Leverick never explains how
one derives a right to kill from the right to life, it is difficult to extrapolate
her theory to non-deadly force cases. Leverick's theory presumably
justifies the killing of a passive threat but cannot justify grabbing a wrist to
prevent a punch. It is wildly implausible that one would need a different
theory for not killing in self-defense than one needs for killing in self-
defense.
88 See Boaz Sangero, A New Defense for Self-Defense, 9 BUFF. CRIM. L. REv. 475, 483-
84 (2006) ("It is important to note that the restriction of the discussion of private defense to
homicide offenses alone, so prevalent in the literature, is both mistaken and misleading-
mistaken because private defense applies also to other offenses, such as simple assault, and
misleading because concentrating solely on situations of 'a life for a life' distorts the
picture .... ").
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V. CONCLUSION
Leverick provides a broad discussion about a number of important
issues in the theory of self-defense. Her book offers readers a good
background of legal theories surrounding the justifiability of self-defensive
killing and seeks to provide her own take on how self-defensive killing
could be grounded in morality.
The background portions of the text are quite helpful, but the overall
theory is quite unpersuasive. The book fails to explain what the author
claims she will successfully answer in the text. Leverick's theory of
forfeiture is constructed to accommodate her intuitions, but otherwise fails
to offer a principled explanation for why we may kill in self-defense.
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